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 “GREENING” THE CHARTER: SECTION 7 AND THE 
RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
Lauren Wortsman* 
ABSTRACT 
Canada is among one of the few remaining United Nations member states 
that does not have a constitutionally protected right to a healthy 
environment. Amid concerns about climate change and its impact on 
human health and well-being, the Constitution has become a focal point 
for advancing environmental justice in Canada. This paper explores three 
questions surrounding environmental rights and the Constitution. First, 
does the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, protected by section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, protect a right to a healthy 
environment? If it does, would such a right strengthen Canada’s framework 
for environmental protection? And lastly, what would a robust conception 
of the right to a healthy environment look like, given the emergence of 
international human rights in the environmental context? 
To answer these questions, this paper analyzes the jurisprudence on section 
7 of the Charter in the environmental context to determine whether a right 
to a healthy environment is protected under the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person. It draws on research from other countries with 
constitutionally protected environmental rights to assess what benefits such 
a right can provide and what challenges it poses. This paper also surveys 
best practices that have emerged from international human rights law to 
understand what the content of a robust right to a healthy environment 
might look like. The author argues that courts have implicitly accepted that 
a right to a healthy environment may be protected by section 7 of the 
Charter, and that courts should recognize such a right as it could help 
Canada strengthen its approach to environmental protection. 
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Despite the serious consequences of climate change on human health and well-
being,1 the international community has not adopted a freestanding right to a healthy 
environment. In response, international bodies have applied human rights law to 
environmental issues by “greening” existing human rights, including the rights to life 
and health.2 Likewise, the Canadian government has not adopted a right to a healthy 
environment. Thus, whether Canada’s laws can similarly be “greened” is an important 
question for Canadians seeking to hold governments responsible for the negative 
consequences of environmental harm.   
As of 2018, 155 of the 193 United Nations member states have recognized a 
legally binding right to a healthy environment somewhere in law – if not 
constitutionally, then through court decisions, in statute, or via the ratification of 
environmentalist international agreements.3 Many other countries have signed non-
binding, soft law declarations that recognize the right to a healthy environment.4 
Canada, in contrast, is one of the few remaining states holding out against the 
meaningful implementation of an environmentalist legal regime.5 Indeed, in almost 
every respect, Canada’s framework for environmental protection falls short.6 Despite 
Canada’s wealth of freshwater resources, there is no national law that regulates 
drinking water quality.7 Alberta’s oil patch is one of the biggest industrial projects in 
the world, but federal laws fail to adequately regulate pollution from oil extraction.8 
 
1 See e.g. Myles R Allen et al, “Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers” (Geneva, 
CH: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) at 15, online: 
<www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_version_stand_alone_LR.pdf>. 
2 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, 37th Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
A/HRC/37/59 (2018) at para 12 [Framework Principles Report]. 
3  UNGAOR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, 73rd Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 74(b), UN 
Doc A/73/188 (2018) at para 36 [Report of the Special Rapporteur].  
4 David R Boyd, “Catalyst for Change: Evaluating Forty Years of Experience in Implementing the Right to a 
Healthy Environment” in John H Knox & Ramin Pejan, eds, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) 17 at 18 [Boyd, “Catalyst”].  
5  David R Boyd, “The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment” (2012) 54:4 Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development 3 [Boyd, “Right to a Healthy Environment”]. 
6 Kimberly Shearon & Margot Venton, “The Right to a Healthy Environment: Canada’s Time to Act” (Vancouver: 
Ecojustice, 2015) at 3, online: <https://ecojustice.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Right_to_a_healthy_environment_FINAL.pdf>. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
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Inconsistencies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction have created an ineffective patchwork 
of environmental laws and weak regulatory standards with major gaps that fail to 
adequately protect the environment.9 
Canada’s poor environmental record has led to substantial deficiencies in the 
country’s healthcare delivery. For example, thousands of Canadians do not have 
access to clean running water, or are exposed to harmful levels of air pollution every 
day.10 Indigenous groups in particular are disproportionately affected by such 
environmental degradation.11 The Aamjiwnaang community, living on a First Nation 
reserve in “Chemical Valley” near Sarnia, Ontario, are one such group. Chemical 
Valley is one of Canada’s largest concentrations of industry, and the reserve is 
surrounded by petrochemical, polymer, and chemical industrial plants.12 Pollution 
released into the atmosphere from these plants has led to an increased risk of death 
from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, lung cancer, diabetes, and heart 
attacks.13 The presence of asthma in Aamjiwnaang children is over two times the 
national average rate. Learning or behavioural disabilities affect more than a quarter 
of children, which is over five times the national average rate. Forty percent of 
Aamjiwnaang women experience miscarriages or stillbirths.14 The environmental 
degradation and resulting health effects in the Aamjiwnaang community are 
illustrative of the inadequacy of Canada’s current approach to protecting 
environmental and human health.  
This injustice underscores the need for Canada to take action to address 
environmental degradation. In recent years, the Constitution has been a focal point 
for achieving environmental justice in Canada.15 Currently, there are no explicit 
provisions in Canada’s Constitution that protect individuals’ right to a healthy 
environment. However, two distinct approaches to environmental protection using 
 
9 Ibid at 5.  
10 Margot Venton, Pierre Sadik & Kaitlyn Mitchell, “Right to a Healthy Environment” Ecojustice (2015),  online: 
<www.ecojustice.ca/case/right-to-a-healthy-environment/>. 
11 Catherine Jean Archibald, “What Kind of Life? Why the Canadian Charter’s Guarantees of  Life and Security of 
the Person Should Include the Right to a Healthy Environment” (2013) 2 Tul J Intl & Comp L 1 at 3 [Archibald].  
12 Constanze A Mackenzie, Ada Lockridge & Margaret Keith, “Declining Sex Ratio in a First Nation Community” 
(2005) 113:10 Environmental Health Perspectives 1295 at 1295.  
13 Archibald, supra note 11 at 6. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Dayna Nadine Scott, “The Environment, Federalism, and the Charter” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & 
Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook to the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017) 493 at 509 [Scott]. 
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the Constitution have emerged from scholarship and practice: (1) the creation of an 
independent right to a healthy environment; and (2) the recognition that a right to a 
healthy environment is protected under our existing rights in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.16  
The first approach conceptualizes the right to a healthy environment as an 
independent, free-standing right that encompasses, but extends beyond, the content 
of existing rights.17 This school of thought argues that because all existing human 
rights, such as the right to life, depend on a viable environment, viewing the 
emergence of environmental rights as an expansion of human rights is scientifically 
backward.18 An analysis of this approach is beyond the scope of this paper, however, 
there exists robust empirical data demonstrating that the incorporation of an explicit 
constitutional right to a healthy environment leads to improved environmental 
protection, with associated human health benefits.19  
The second approach grounds the right to a healthy environment within 
recognized human rights such as the rights to life, liberty, security of the person, 
equality, and health.20 This approach recognizes that a certain level of environmental 
health is a necessary precondition to the enjoyment of all other rights.21 Arguably, the 
most obvious “home” for the right to a healthy environment is section 7 of the 
Charter, which protects the right to life, liberty, and security of the person.22  
This paper seeks to answer three questions. First, does section 7 of the Charter 
protect a right to a healthy environment? Second, would a constitutionally protected 
right to a healthy environment strengthen Canada’s framework for environmental 
protection? And third, what would a robust conception of the right to a healthy 
environment look like, given the emergence of international human rights in the 
environmental context? To answer these questions, this paper first analyzes section 7 
 
16 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; Lynda M 
Collins, “Safeguarding the Longue Durée: Environmental Rights in the Canadian Constitution” (2015) 71 SCLR 
519 at 520 [Collins, “Safeguarding”]. 
17 Collins, “Safeguarding”, supra note 16 at 522. 
18 Ibid.  
19 See David R Boyd, “Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment: National Approaches” in Anna Grear 
& Louis J Kotzé, Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2015) 170 [Boyd, “Constitutions”]; David Richard Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). 
20 Collins, “Safeguarding”, supra note 16 at 521. 
21 Ibid at 522.  
22 Ibid at 529; Charter, supra note 16, s 7.  
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of the Charter and Canadian jurisprudence on section 7 in the environmental context 
to determine whether a right to a healthy environment is protected under the right to 
life, liberty, and security of the person. Next, this paper draws on research from other 
countries with constitutionally protected environmental rights to assess what benefits 
such a right can provide and what challenges it poses. Finally, it surveys best practices 
that have emerged from international human rights law to understand what the 
content of a robust right to a healthy environment might look like. This paper 
demonstrates that although Canadian courts have not explicitly recognized the right 
to a healthy environment, they have implicitly accepted that such a right may exist 
within the right to life, liberty, and security of the person in section 7 of the Charter, 
and may be open to so finding in an appropriate case. Further, courts should explicitly 
recognize a right to a healthy environment in section 7 of the Charter, as a 
constitutionally protected right will help Canada strengthen its approach to 
environmental protection. 
DOES SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER PROTECT A RIGHT TO A 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
Section 7 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.”23 This section will first discuss how a right 
to a healthy environment could fit within the section 7 framework, and then show 
that there are no doctrinal issues to using this section to protect the right to a healthy 
environment. Finally, an analysis of the jurisprudence on section 7 in the 
environmental context will show that the courts may be open to finding that the rights 
to life, liberty, and security of the person protect a right to a healthy environment.  
Section 7 and a Right to a Healthy Environment 
Section 7 is “rooted in a profound respect for the value of human life.”24 The 
right to life, at the very least, means that a person may not be deprived of their life, 
 
23 Charter, supra note 16, s 7.  
24 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 63 [Carter]. 
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nor face a significant risk of the loss of life, due to state action.25 Liberty involves 
freedom from restraint and the personal autonomy to make decisions that are of 
fundamental personal importance.26 Security of the person encompasses the freedom 
from state interference with bodily integrity and from serious, state-imposed risks to 
physical health and psychological integrity.27   
A right to a healthy environment does not necessitate creating a new 
“environmental component” of the right to life, liberty, or security of the person. 
Rather, it entails the recognition that environmental degradation can cause the loss of 
life, liberty, or security of the person just as surely as other state action.28 The 
following example illustrates how environmental harm can cause the same loss of life 
as other state action that is prohibited by section 7:  
If a citizen is asphyxiated by noxious gases emanating from a 
government-operated incinerator, she is equally as dead as if she 
had been shot or beaten by government agents. It would be 
irrational for human rights law to provide less protection in the 
latter scenario than it does in the former; this would, in a sense, 
create an environmental exemption from the right to life.29 
Recognizing a right to a healthy environment acknowledges that 
environmental harm can cause the same deprivations of life, liberty, and 
security of the person that other state action causes.  
The right would not guarantee a “pristine environment free from chemicals or 
pollution.”30 Instead, it would highlight the vital role that the environment plays in 
the realization of “human dignity and welfare.”31 Given that the recognition of a right 
to a healthy environment does not require the creation of new rights, it follows that 
the right to a healthy environment fits comfortably within the existing section 7 
doctrine. 
 
25 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 at para 45.  
26 Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 54.  
27 Carter, supra note 24 at para 64.  
28 Lynda Margaret Collins, “Are We There Yet? The Right to Environment in International and European Law” 
(2007) 3:2 JSDLP 119 at 127.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Kaitlyn Mitchell & Zachary D’Onofrio, “Environmental Injustice and Racism in Canada” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & 
Prac 305 at 324 [Mitchell & D’Onofrio]. 
31 Ibid.  
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No Doctrinal Issues 
The right to life, liberty, and security of the person in the environmental context 
raises questions about whose rights are involved, and the requisite causation to 
establish a violation of these rights. Can state action that causes a public health hazard 
violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person under section 7? “Must 
someone get sick and be able to conclusively prove the source of his or her illness 
before the courts will act?”32 These questions do not pose a doctrinal problem for 
recognizing the right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the Charter. 
A law requiring an individual to be involuntarily injected with a quantity of some 
harmful substance, such as arsenic, may clearly violate a person’s section 7 rights.33 In 
the environmental context, however, toxins are injected into the environment rather 
than directly into individuals. Thus, when a pollutant is emitted into the environment, 
we are often no longer dealing with the rights of an identifiable individual. Instead, 
we are concerned with the rights of an unidentifiable individual who may eventually 
get sick, or the rights of all members of the community not to have to risk becoming 
sick, or both.34 In this context, evidence would inevitably depend on statistical 
materials demonstrating risk and probability of harm, rather than conclusive proof of 
causation and harm.35 
If the Charter is to be an effective tool for protecting individuals from harm, the 
courts must be able to examine such risk before the harm occurs.36 The mere fact that 
the public as a whole may be affected by a particular state action does not detract 
from the impact of the rights violation on individuals, whether those individuals are 
identified or not.37 Likewise, the fact that the harm may occur in the future does not 
pose any doctrinal issues for finding a right to a healthy environment under section 
7. A violation of life or security of the person can occur with the risk of harm, and 
not merely when an actual impact on the right occurs.38  
 
32 Andrew Gage, “Public Health Hazards and Section 7 of the Charter” (2003) 13 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 3.  
33  Ibid at 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid at 3.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
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The Supreme Court of Canada further dispensed of doctrinal challenges to this 
concept in Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford39 when it confirmed that the rights to 
life, liberty, or security of the person can be infringed where there is a risk of harm to 
unidentified individuals. In Bedford, three applicants argued that laws that prohibited 
sex workers from taking measures to protect themselves from violence violated their 
rights under section 7 of the Charter. McLachlin CJ, writing for a unanimous Supreme 
Court, held that the impugned laws put sex workers at greater risk of violence, and 
thus violated sex workers’ security of the person.40 The section 7 claim was successful 
even though the claimants did not argue that they directly suffered the harms alleged 
as a result of the impugned laws.41 The Court held that, provided a “sufficient causal 
connection”42 can be demonstrated between the government action and the harm or 
risk of harm, section 7 will be available to protect the right to life, liberty, and security 
of the person even where there is a risk of harm to unidentified individuals. As such, 
the fact that a particular environmental threat only poses a risk of harm, or poses a 
risk to unidentified individuals, does not prohibit the application of section 7 to the 
environmental context.  
Jurisprudence on Section 7 of the Charter in the Environmental Context 
To date, the bulk of lawsuits related to environmental harms have been 
grounded in environmental statutes, treaties, and common law causes of action.43 
With the exception of a small number of lawsuits, plaintiffs have generally not looked 
to substantive rights in constitutional law, and section 7 of the Charter in particular, to 
advance their claims.44 However, in its current state, the jurisprudence on section 7 
provides a strong basis for challenging government-sanctioned activities that create 
risks to public health.45  
The few Canadian cases wherein claimants relied on section 7 to challenge 
government-sanctioned environmental harm have been unsuccessful. However, these 
 
39 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford]. 
40 Ibid at paras 85, 92.  
41 Ibid at paras 6, 164.  
42 Ibid at para 75.  
43 Avnish Nanda, “Heavy Oil Processing in Peace River, Alberta: a Case Study on the Scope of Section 7 of the 
Charter in the Environmental Realm” (2015) 27 J Envtl L & Prac 109 at 110 [Nanda]. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
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claims failed due to procedural and factual deficiencies, and not because the courts 
reject the notion that section 7 protects a right to a healthy environment.46 In fact, 
these cases illustrate that courts are open to accepting that a risk to public health from 
environmental harm may constitute a violation of section 7 of the Charter.  
One of the earliest cases in which section 7 was argued to protect environmental 
health is Manicom et al v County of Oxford et al.47 In Manicom, the plaintiffs challenged the 
proposed construction of a landfill, citing negative health effects.48 Saunders J, writing 
for a majority of the Ontario Divisional Court, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim on the 
basis that they had failed to specifically plead health hazards.49 The claim was not 
rejected on the basis of environmental health falling outside the scope of section 7.  
In Millership v British Columbia50 and Locke v Calgary (City),51 the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia and the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, respectively, considered 
whether public health risks posed by the fluoridation of water by a municipality 
violated section 7 of the Charter. Both courts dismissed the claims, finding that 
fluoridation was not shown to have significant negative health risks.52 However, the 
courts in both cases seem to accept the proposition that a risk to public health could 
constitute a violation of section 7.53 
In Energy Probe v Canada (Attorney General),54 the plaintiffs sought to bring an 
application alleging a violation of section 7 of the Charter by a law that limited the 
financial liability of a nuclear plant operator in the case of a nuclear accident. The 
plaintiffs argued the law would encourage the development of nuclear power plants, 
which would increase the overall risk of nuclear accidents.55 Although the plaintiffs 
had not alleged that a public health hazard did exist, but that the government’s actions 
increased the likelihood of such a hazard, the plaintiffs were granted leave to bring 
the case. Carthy JA, writing for the Court, held that the plaintiffs’ allegations, if 
proven, could “demonstrate a present risk to them and others and a threat, or 
 
46 Ibid at 125.  
47 (1985), 52 OR (2d) 137 (t) [Manicom]. 
48 Ibid at 141.  
49 Ibid at 154.  
50 2003 BCSC 82 [Millership].  
51 (1993), 15 Alta LR (3d) 70 (QB). 
52 Ibid at paras 33, 37; Millership, supra note 50 at para 111. 
53 Gage, supra note 32 at 8. 
54 (1989), 58 DLR (4th) 513 (Ont CA).  
55 Ibid at 514–15.  
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perceived threat, to security of the person.”56 The case was later heard and dismissed 
by the General Division of the then-Ontario Court of Justice.57 Wright J found that 
the plaintiffs had not proven a sufficient link between the impugned law and an 
increased risk to health.58  
The Alberta Court of Appeal considered the applicability of section 7 in the oil 
and gas context in Kelly v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board)59 and Domke v Alberta 
(Energy Resources Conservation Board).60 In both cases, the applicants challenged the 
provincial energy regulator’s decision to approve the drilling of sour oil wells, arguing 
that the approval violated section 7 by creating serious health hazards.61 The regulator 
sought to have the claims dismissed in each case.62 In Kelly, the Court granted leave 
to bring the application, finding that the applicants’ section 7 argument raised a 
“serious arguable point” of law.63 However, after leave was granted, the respondent 
withdrew the application for the wells and the case was subsequently dismissed as 
moot.64 In Domke, the application for leave was dismissed because the drilling only 
posed minimal health and safety risks to the surrounding residents.65 Although no 
section 7 violation was established in either case, implicit in the Court’s analysis in 
both decisions is that section 7 may be a viable option for individuals seeking redress 
for environmental harms resulting from government action. 
This collective jurisprudence indicates that numerous courts have implicitly 
accepted the applicability of section 7 in the environmental context. None of the 
claims in these cases were rejected on the basis that section 7 does not protect a right 
to a healthy environment. Rather, these cases demonstrate the courts’ willingness to 
consider the issue. Indeed, it is clear throughout that Canadian courts are open to 
finding that state action that results in environmental harm can cause public health 
hazards, and that such health hazards may violate section 7. 
 
56 Ibid at 538.  
57 Energy Probe v Canada (Attorney General) (1994), 17 OR (3d) 717.  
58 Ibid at 732.  
59 2008 ABCA 52 [Kelly]. 
60 2008 ABCA 232 [Domke].  
61 Kelly, supra note 59 at para 15; Ibid at para 6. 
62 Kelly, supra note 59 at paras 1, 9–10; Domke, supra note 60 at para 2. 
63 Kelly, supra note 59 at paras 1, 19.  
64 Nanda, supra note 43 at 126. 
65 Domke, supra note 60 at paras 26–27.  
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Nevertheless, the courts have yet to explicitly recognize a right to a healthy 
environment under section 7 of the Charter.66 However, the jurisprudence suggests 
that, provided a claim is procedurally sound and supported by a compelling factual 
record, there is no obstacle to applying section 7 to harm resulting from 
environmental degradation.67 As such, section 7 of the Charter “should be an arrow in 
the quiver of any lawyer seeking to curb industrial development that creates serious 
health risks.”68 
Using section 7 to seek redress for health hazards resulting from environmental 
harm has gained traction in recent years. For example, in 2011, two members of the 
Aamjiwnaang community filed an application for judicial review of a decision to issue 
a permit to increase emissions from a refinery in Chemical Valley.69 The applicants 
argued that the issuance of the permit without consideration for the cumulative effects 
from all industrial emissions in the area violated their section 7 rights because the 
exceedingly high levels of emissions posed health risks to members of the 
community.70 The application was ultimately withdrawn in response to efforts from 
the provincial government to control pollution, but the case’s demands for what the 
Charter should guarantee gained significant attention across the country.71  
Another recent attempt to use section 7 to seek redress for health hazards caused 
by environmental harm indicates that the push for a right to a healthy environment is 
gaining traction. In September 2015, Grassy Narrows First Nation filed an application 
for judicial review of the Ontario government’s approval of clearcut logging activities. 
The applicants argued that clearcut logging releases mercury into the environment 
causing serious health effects that violate their rights under section 7.72 This case has 
not been heard to date, but the Ontario government has since committed $85 million 
to clean up mercury contamination on Grassy Narrows’ homeland.73 These cases are 
 
66 Nanda, supra note 43 at 127. 
67 Ibid at 125. 
68 Ibid at 110. 
69 Scott, supra note 15 at 509.  
70 Ibid at 510.  
71 Ibid at 509.  
72 “Grassy Narrows Sues Ontario Over Mercury Health Threat from Clearcut Logging” Free Grassy Narrows [an 
activist group] (14 September 2015), online: <freegrassy.net/2015/09/14/grassy-narrows-sues-ontario-over-
mercury-health-threat-from-clearcut-logging/>. 
73 David Bruser, Robert Benzie & Jayme Poisson, “Ontario Commits $85 Million to Clean Up ‘Gross Neglect’ at 
Grassy Narrows” Toronto Star (27 June 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/06/27/ontario-gives-85-
million-to-clean-up-gross-neglect-at-grassy-narrows.html>.  
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paving the way for future claims for environmental rights under section 7 of the 
Charter. 
WILL A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT STRENGTHEN CANADA’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
There is great potential for a constitutionally protected right to a healthy 
environment under section 7 of the Charter to strengthen the Canadian approach to 
environmental protection. This is broadly evident in research from other countries 
which have enacted the constitutional right to a healthy environment. Such 
jurisdictions demonstrate that constitutionally protected environmental rights result 
in benefits including: the provision of alternative avenues for redress for 
environmental harm, the prevention of rollbacks on environmental standards, the 
strengthening of environmental laws, and the improvement of environmental 
performance. Other benefits may include entrenchment of the precautionary 
principle and encouraging the adoption of an explicit right to a healthy environment.  
These advantages will be discussed in turn before proceeding to a discussion of the 
challenges associated with a right to a healthy environment under section 7.  
Advantages of a Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment 
Alternative Avenue for Redress 
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy advantages of recognizing a right to a 
healthy environment under section 7 is that it provides an alternative avenue for 
redress for environmental harm that causes health issues. Current statutory and 
common law causes of action allow individuals to seek redress from private actors, 
but there are very few mechanisms for seeking government accountability. A claim 
under section 7 of the Charter recognizes the role and responsibility of the government 
in sanctioning activities that create damages to the environment and public health.74  
In practice, this means that bringing a claim under section 7 can often be more 
advantageous than doing so under current statutory or common law causes of 
 
74 Nanda, supra note 43 at 136. 
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action.75 The bulk of environmental legislation in Ontario is contained in the 
Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993.76 This statute largely focuses on the right to 
participate in environmental decision-making in the province.77 The preamble states 
that citizens of Ontario have the “right to a healthful environment”78 but this language 
is not contained in an actual legislative provision anywhere in the statute. At the 
federal level, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 199979 focuses on public 
participation and provides for an environmental registry for matters that fall under 
the statute.80 While these procedural rights are very important, there is no substantive 
dimension to environmental rights contained in these statutes, meaning that decisions 
ultimately remain entirely in the government’s hands.81 As such, these statutes provide 
little in the way of redress for government-approved action that creates environmental 
and health hazards.  
Under the common law, tort law provides another traditional remedy. Claimants 
who have suffered negative health effects from environmental harms often rely on 
the doctrine of public nuisance where there has been an interference with public 
rights.82 However, the standing rules often serve to limit public nuisance as an 
available remedy; one can sue in public nuisance only if one has suffered “special 
damages”, or with the consent of the Attorney General.83 Alternatively, claimants who 
have suffered physical injury or property damage will often sue in negligence. 
However, in the environmental context, it can be difficult to establish all the elements 
of negligence, and causation in particular.84 In a negligence claim, the claimant must 
show that it is more likely than not that his or her particular injury flowed from the 
defendant’s activities.85 Such evidence can be difficult to obtain where environmental 
or health harms are involved.86  
 
75 Ibid. 
76 SO 1993, c 28.  
77 Nanda, supra note 43 at 137. 
78 Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, supra note 76. 
79 SC 1999, c 33. 
80 Nanda, supra note 43 at 137. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid at 136. 
83 Ibid at 136–37. 
84 Ibid at 137. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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Causation under section 7 of the Charter is different than causation in tort law, 
and as such, a right to a healthy environment can provide an alternative avenue for 
redress for health hazards that result from environmental harm. Unlike causation in 
the tort context, claimants of section 7 violations are not required to prove that they 
suffered harm directly.87 Causation under section 7 does not require a claimant to 
establish that the government’s action is the “only or the dominant cause of the 
prejudice suffered to the claimant.”88 Rather, proof of merely a “sufficient causal 
connection” is required.89 This standard means that section 7 claims may be available 
where statutory or common law remedies would otherwise be unavailable.   
In addition to providing an alternative cause of action for a health claim 
stemming from environmental harm, section 7 Charter challenges also provide a 
mechanism by which individuals can trigger the review of legislation by courts. This 
may be a particularly important tool for marginalized groups who often lack the 
political and monetary resources to affect change through law and policy making.90  
Research from countries with a constitutionally protected right to a healthy 
environment shows that some politically and economically marginalized communities 
have enjoyed success in the courts in enforcing their right to a healthy environment.91 
In Argentina, litigation based on constitutional environmental rights resulted in a 
court-ordered clean up and restoration of the Matanza-Riachuelo watershed, which 
will lead to improved living conditions for millions of economically marginalized 
people.92 Likewise, in Peru, residents of La Oroya were finally able to obtain medical 
treatment for their long-term exposure to lead emitted by a nearby smelter after 
litigation of their constitutional environmental rights.93 Evidently, in Canada, a section 
7 claim may be an important tool for those individuals and groups most affected by 
government-authorized environmental harm.  
Entrenching the Precautionary Principle 
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A corollary that flows from the causation standard under section 7 is that it 
provides a basis to constitutionally entrench the precautionary principle.94 This 
doctrine holds that where there are threats to human health and the environment, the 
fact that there is scientific uncertainty as to those threats should not be a reason for 
refusing to take action to prevent them.95 The principle has been codified in several 
international treaties to which Canada is a signatory, however, its application in the 
domestic context is limited.96  
Section 7 confers protections from potential harms that have not occurred and 
may never materialize. It places the onus on the government to justify activity that 
not only causes harm, but increases the risk of harm.97 As such, section 7 is wholly 
consistent with the precautionary principle. While it “narrows the precautionary 
principle through the lens of individual rights protections,” section 7 may provide a 
meaningful mechanism through which to constrain the government’s ability to engage 
in activities that potentially cause environmental harms, even where there is scientific 
uncertainty as to the effects of those activities.98 
Preventing Rollbacks 
Another advantage flowing from a constitutional right to a healthy environment 
is that it may result in the application of the principle of non-regression, also known 
as the standstill principle, in the environmental law context.99 This principle holds that 
existing environmental laws are to be treated as a baseline that can be strengthened, 
but not weakened.100 It prevents the future weakening of environmental laws and 
policies, often referred to as rollbacks.101 
The standstill principle takes on heightened significance in Canada where, in 
recent years, many key federal and provincial environmental laws have been rolled 
back.102 For example, in 2012, the federal government gutted some of Canada’s most 
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important environmental laws when it forced through its omnibus budgetary bills.103 
As such, the National Energy Board Act,104 the governing legislation for the National 
Energy Board, is one law that is significantly weaker today than it was prior to 2012.105 
The federal government, as part of its efforts to fast-track the then-Kinder Morgan 
Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline project, rewrote several parts of the Act, 
sacrificing independent science and thorough review in the process.106 The result is a 
“deeply flawed process” in which opportunities for public input have been restricted 
and the consideration of environmental and human health impacts of climate change 
and oil sands development associated with the pipeline has been excluded.107  
Another example of a significant rollback is the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act,108 which established environmental assessment processes intended to identify, 
evaluate, and mitigate adverse environmental effects that may result from the federal 
government’s projects.109 The CEAA was repealed and replaced by the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.110 The CEAA, 2012 significantly decreased the 
scope of projects required to undergo an environmental assessment, expanded 
ministerial discretion, and considerably narrowed the nature of environmental 
assessment requirements.111 The result is that the number of environmental 
assessments triggered under the CEAA, 2012 has significantly decreased from the 
number triggered under the previous CEAA.112 In particular, many medium or small 
projects, which may nevertheless cause direct, indirect, or cumulative environmental 
effects, are no longer subject to environmental assessment.113    
The recognition that environmental harm causing health hazards can constitute 
a violation of section 7 of the Charter could force the government to consider the 
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health impacts from proposed environmental laws prior to enacting them. In this way, 
a constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment could prevent harmful 
rollbacks before they happen.114 This advantage has been realized in some countries 
with a constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment. For example, 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court rejected an attempt to privatize publicly owned 
forests because weaker environmental standards governed private lands.115 Moreover, 
in Belgium, authorities rejected a proposal to accommodate motor racing by 
weakening standards for air and noise pollution because it would have violated 
Belgium’s prohibition on rolling back environmental protections.116 If the Canadian 
government adopted similar legislative mechanisms, this could be a significant step 
forward in strengthening Canada’s legal framework for environmental protection. 
Strengthening Environmental Laws 
Beyond preventing rollbacks, constitutional recognition of a right to a healthy 
environment could strengthen environmental laws. Research shows that a 
constitutional right to a healthy environment can facilitate increased implementation 
and enforcement of environmental laws.117 In at least 80 countries, environmental 
laws were strengthened after the right to a healthy environment was constitutionally 
entrenched.118 In most cases, laws were amended to increase access to environmental 
information, increase access to justice, and enhance participation in environmental 
decision-making.119 For example, the reform of Argentina’s constitution in 1994 to 
include the right to a healthy environment sparked the passing of new laws setting out 
minimum standards for industrial waste and clean water and governing access to 
environmental information.120 It also caused a cascade effect in which provincial 
constitutions were amended to incorporate the right, and provincial environmental 
laws were altered to be brought in line with the constitution.121 
Further examples of stronger environmental laws following explicit 
constitutional recognition come from Costa Rica and the Philippines. In Costa Rica, 
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the constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment in 1994 
contributed to a significant increase in the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental legislation.122 Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court has enforced 
environmental laws relating to solid waste, sewage treatment, air pollution, 
groundwater, and endangered species, holding that the right to a healthy environment 
includes the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and intergenerational 
equity principles.123 In the Philippines, constitutional recognition of the right to a 
healthy environment has also lead to the strengthening of environmental laws. Since 
constitutional recognition, the Philippines has developed special rules of procedure 
for environmental litigation, which are specifically intended to facilitate protection of 
the right to a healthy environment.124 
In Brazil, the constitutional recognition of environmental rights in 1988 led to a 
dramatic increase in the enforcement of environmental laws.125 This reform enabled 
the public and non-governmental organizations to report alleged violations of 
environmental rights to an independent body, the Ministerio Publico, which conducts 
investigations, civil actions, and prosecutions.126 Between 1984 and 2004, in the state 
of Sao Paolo alone, the Ministerio Publico filed over 4,000 public civil actions in 
environmental cases, addressing issues ranging from deforestation to air pollution.127 
These examples demonstrate the benefits of a constitutional right to a healthy 
environment. It is also interesting to note that the number of countries who 
experienced no discernable strengthening of environmental laws following 
constitutional recognition of environmental rights is very small.128 Among these 
countries are nations where either: (a) the constitutional changes are very recent (e.g. 
Grenada’s 2015 constitutional reform); or (b) civil war and other overriding social, 
economic, or political crises are present (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo).129 
This suggests that constitutional recognition of environmental rights generally leads 
 
122 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 3 at para 41.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid at para 42.  
125 Boyd, “Catalyst”, supra note 4 at 28.  
126 Ibid.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid at 26.  
129 Ibid.   
Vol. 28 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 263 
 
to strengthening of environmental laws in a majority of countries that are not dealing 
with war or other crises. 
Prefacing the Adoption of an Explicit Constitutional Right 
As of 2018, 100 countries had an explicit constitutional right to a healthy 
environment.130 Of these 100 countries, the courts in at least 8 found an implicit right 
to a healthy environment within existing constitutional provisions prior to the explicit 
right being incorporated into their respective constitutions.131 The recognition of an 
implicit right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the Charter may therefore 
be the first step towards an explicit incorporation of environmental rights in Canada’s 
Constitution. 
It may be that the causal relationship works in the other direction, and nations 
that already have strong environmental policies are more likely to entrench 
constitutional environmental rights.132  However, the case for entrenching 
environmental protection in national constitutions is compelling.133 When the causal 
relationship is combined with evidence of stronger environmental legislation, 
enhanced opportunities for public participation in environmental decision-making, 
and increased enforcement of environmental laws, the benefits of explicit 
constitutional protection for environmental rights are persuasive.134 
Improving Environmental Performance 
Research has shown that the constitutional recognition of environmental rights 
provides persuasive, albeit not determinative, evidence of substantial environmental 
and health benefits.135 One study concluded that nations with a constitutional right to 
a healthy environment have smaller ecological footprints, rank higher on 
comprehensive indices of environmental indicators, are more likely to ratify 
international environmental agreements, and have made faster progress in reducing 
emissions of harmful pollutants.136 For example, between 1980 and 2005, wealthy 
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industrialized nations with a right to a healthy environment reduced sulfur dioxide 
emissions by 84.8 percent.137 In contrast, wealthy industrialized nations without 
recognized environmental rights reduced emissions by just 52.8 percent during the 
same period.138 Another study found that a constitutional right to a healthy 
environment was positively related to increases in the proportion of populations with 
access to safe drinking water.139 These studies demonstrate that the constitutional 
right to a healthy environment provides tangible benefits in terms of environmental 
health.  
The advantages of recognizing a right to a healthy environment under section 7 
of the Charter are compelling. The ability to hold the government accountable for 
actions that lead to environmental and health harms, to prevent new governments 
from rolling back protections put in place by previous governments, and to seek 
redress for future harms that have not occurred yet, particularly where scientific 
evidence may not be conclusive, are immensely important to building a stronger 
framework for environmental protection. However, there are well founded criticisms 
as to what a constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment will achieve in 
practice. Using section 7 to seek redress for environmental and health harms requires 
undertaking litigation, which poses access to justice issues. Further challenges include 
the fact that the Charter applies only to government action, and cannot address gaps 
in environmental protections where governments have failed to legislate. These 
challenges are addressed in turn. 
Challenges of a Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment 
Access to Justice 
A major shortcoming of a constitutional right to a healthy environment under 
section 7 of the Charter is that it is often difficult for communities most affected by 
environmental degradation to take advantage of their constitutional rights.140 
Litigation favours repeat players and parties with financial resources.141 Other barriers 
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such as limited awareness of rights and lack of access to legal assistance pose 
significant problems for many individuals who could stand to benefit from a right to 
a healthy environment.142 Addressing these barriers to justice is a critical precondition 
to the realization of constitutional environmental rights for many individuals.  
Section 7 Applies Only to Government Action 
A second critique of a constitutional right to a healthy environment is that the 
Charter applies only to state action, and the majority of environmentally harmful 
activity is arguably conducted by private actors.143 It is well established that the Charter 
does not apply to common law litigation between private parties.144 The Charter will 
only apply to private action when there is a sufficient element of government action.145 
However, in the environmental context, governments may create serious 
environmental harm in several ways, attracting Charter application.146  
The first way is that the Canadian government operates major facilities, such as 
sewage treatment facilities and power plants, that emit pollution into the natural 
environment. Such action could clearly trigger Charter application. Second, 
governments may create environmental harms capable of infringing constitutional 
rights by permitting pollution or other forms of environmental degradation.147 For 
example, industrial polluters are subject to federal, provincial and municipal regulatory 
regimes requiring permits for polluting activities.148 The issuance of a licence or permit 
by the government permitting a particular environmentally harmful emission or 
activity meets the requirement for state conduct, thereby attracting Charter 
application.149  
The third way that governments may create environmental harms is by setting 
statutory and regulatory standards that allow for the emission of harmful levels of 
pollution.150 While private activity is not subject to the Charter, laws that regulate 
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private activity are.151 Governments pass a wide range of laws that regulate private 
actions that may result in public health hazards.152 Where regulatory standards are out 
of date, or fail to protect environmental and human health, the Charter will be available 
to hold the government accountable.153  
Thus, in effect, almost all private industrial activity that may lead to 
environmental harms is in some way regulated or controlled by state action. Many, if 
not most, environmental harms would not occur but for positive government 
action.154 Where the government does not act directly in releasing harmful pollution 
into the environment, its actions in granting permits and setting regulatory standards 
enables Charter violations by private actors.155 While  environmental harms are caused 
by purely private actions in some instances, the wide scope of environmental laws and 
regulations means the Charter will be a viable tool for seeking redress in many cases, 
even where the immediate cause is a private actor.  
Inability to Address Legislative Gaps 
A further shortcoming of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 is its 
inability to address legislative gaps where governments have not regulated in particular 
spheres. The courts’ interpretation of the Charter does not, of itself, require the state 
to act where it has not already legislated in respect of a certain area.156 For example 
the Canadian government has no national water law, meaning that communities under 
federal jurisdiction, such as First Nations reservations, have no legal protection for 
their drinking water.157 The result is a disproportionate prevalence of boil-water 
advisories and water-borne illness in First Nations communities.158 Section 7 will not 
be of any assistance to these communities as the Charter cannot force the government 
to act where it has chosen not to legislate.  
While the Charter cannot be used to fill legislative gaps, it does apply to 
“underinclusive” state action. Underinclusive state action refers to legislation that fails 
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to fully protect individuals’ Charter rights.159 Where the government decides to legislate 
in a particular area, it must do so in a manner that complies with the Charter.160 For 
example, Canada’s current laws regulating chemical emissions are outdated and 
inadequate for the protection of human health because they fail to take into account 
the pollutants already being emitted in any given area by other facilities before permits 
are issued.161 Regulations set standards for specific concentrations of pollutions at a 
given point source, such as a smokestack or effluent pipe, but do not limit the total 
volume of emissions.162 The result is that the government could issue a number of 
permits in a particular location that, on their own, satisfy standards set out by 
regulations, but cumulatively result in levels of pollution that are dangerous to human 
health.163  
A right to a healthy environment under section 7 would require federal and 
provincial governments to update their legislation to adequately protect public 
health.164 This may require the use of a modern scientific understanding of how 
cumulative pollution affects health to set appropriate standards for emissions, and 
refusing to issue new permits until it can be established that the cumulative effects of 
new permits would not pose a hazard to environmental and human health.165 In this 
way, although a constitutional right to a healthy environment cannot fill legislative 
gaps, it is an important tool for bringing current legislation in line with Charter rights. 
The challenges highlighted in this section pose very real barriers in some 
instances where section 7 is sought to protect environmental rights. Gaps in 
environmental legislation will continue to weaken environmental protection, and 
strong statutory frameworks are required to protect environmental health where the 
Charter does not apply. Moreover, access to justice continues to remain a significant 
barrier to many individuals and communities seeking redress for environmental 
harms. While these challenges must be addressed in order for Canada to fully realize 
its environmental protection goals, they should not be viewed as sufficient reasons to 
 
159 Nanda, supra note 43 at 118. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Archibald, supra note 11 at 7. 
162 Collins, “Safeguarding”, supra note 16 at 529. 
163 Archibald, supra note 11 at 7. 
164 Ibid at 8. 
165 Ibid.  
268 “GREENING” THE CHARTER Vol. 28 
 
 
disregard the importance of recognizing a right to a healthy environment under 
section 7 of the Charter.  
Nor should the many criticisms levied by the opponents of a right to a healthy 
environment stand in the way of the recognition of such a right under section 7. While 
these critics cite the illegitimacy of judicial activism, unpredictable nature of vague 
laws,166 and the threat of floods of frivolous litigation as reasons to reject a right to a 
healthy environment, few of these potential issues have materialized in practice.167 
There has been no flood of frivolous litigation; lawsuits based on the right to a healthy 
environment represent a small fraction of the total number of cases in any given 
country, and enjoy a high success rate.168 The widespread reliance on the right to a 
healthy environment by the public, legislatures, and courts demonstrates that the right 
is neither too vague to be implemented nor merely duplicative of protections offered 
by existing human rights and environmental laws.169 Finally, excessive judicial activism 
can pose a threat to democracy. For example, the Supreme Court of India has been 
accused of exceeding its reach in several high-profile cases.170 However, the Court’s 
action has been viewed as a response to the Indian government’s persistent failure to 
implement and enforce its environmental laws in accordance with its constitution.171 
In general, excessive judicial activism is rare.172 These criticisms have largely not come 
to fruition and as such, should not prohibit the recognition of a right to a healthy 
environment under section 7.  
The advantages discussed above suggest that a constitutional environmental 
right could go a long way in helping Canada strengthen its framework for 
environmental protection. Research from countries with a constitutionally protected 
right to a healthy environment provides persuasive evidence of the tangible benefits 
of such a right. Addressing the challenges, and access to justice in particular, could go 
a long way in increasing the realization of the advantages of a right to a healthy 
environment.  
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WHAT COULD THE CONTENT OF A RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT LOOK LIKE? 
The recognition of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the Charter 
does not require creating new rights. It merely requires effective legal argumentation 
and judicial recognition that environmental harms can cause the same deprivations of 
life, liberty, and security of the person as any other state action that is prohibited by 
section 7. And while section 3 of this paper demonstrates that the advantages of a 
constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment are significant, it is worth 
looking to other conceptions of environmental rights to assess what role a right to a 
healthy environment under section 7 could play if courts were to give a more robust 
interpretation to this right.  
In answering this question, courts can find guidance from international human 
rights laws. As in Canada, the international community has not explicitly recognized 
a free-standing right to a healthy environment in a binding universal declaration.173 
However, international bodies have applied already-recognized human rights laws, 
such as the right to life and health, to the environmental context, thereby “greening” 
existing human rights.174 If a court engages in a similar “greening” of section 7, 
looking to international law can provide a helpful framework as to the content of such 
a right. 
Lessons from the “Greening” of International Human Rights 
Canada is signatory to numerous international agreements pertaining to human 
rights. While these international obligations are not legally binding until they are 
enacted into domestic legislation,175 they can serve as guidance for the interpretation 
of Canada’s Constitution.176 Sources of international human rights law, such as 
declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of 
international tribunals, and customary norms, are relevant and persuasive sources for 
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interpreting the Charter’s provisions.177 In Slaight Communications v Davidson,178 Dickson 
CJC, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the Charter 
is presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar 
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.179 As 
such, looking to international human rights obligations can provide valuable insight 
into the content of a robust right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the 
Charter.  
In his mandate as Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, John H. Knox studied the existing body of international human rights law 
to assess the state of international human rights obligations as they relate to the 
environment. From this study, the Special Rapporteur identified numerous legal 
statements that together create a body of human rights norms relating to the 
environment.180 Despite the diversity of sources from which they arise, the Special 
Rapporteur noted that these statements are “remarkably coherent.”181 As a whole, 
they provide strong evidence of converging trends towards greater uniformity and 
certainty in human rights obligations as they relate to the environment.182 
To help facilitate the practical implementation of these obligations, the Special 
Rapporteur distilled the existing human rights obligations relating to the environment 
into 16 “Framework Principles” on human rights and the environment.183 The 
Framework Principles set out basic obligations of states under human rights law as 
they relate to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.184 
They do not create new obligations; rather, they reflect the application of existing 
human rights obligations to the environmental context.185 As a whole, the Framework 
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Principles represent a set of best practices for environmental rights based on current 
human rights obligations.186 
As Canadian courts grapple with the content question of a right to a healthy 
environment, the Framework Principles can provide useful guidance. These 
Principles, and the underlying body of international human rights obligations that they 
are based on, recognize that the obligations of states in relation to the right to a healthy 
environment consist of three main components: (1) procedural obligations, (2) 
substantive obligations, and (3) obligations towards vulnerable groups.187 Each of 
these obligations are discussed in turn. 
Procedural Obligations 
The Special Rapporteur’s review of the existing body of human rights law 
revealed that international law imposes certain procedural obligations on states in 
relation to environmental protection.188 These procedural obligations include a duty 
to: (1) assess environmental impacts and make environmental information public, (2) 
facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making, and (3) provide 
access to remedies for harm.189 These duties are reflected in the Framework 
Principles.  
Duty to Asses Environmental Impacts and Make Environmental Information Public 
The first procedural obligation existing under current international human rights 
obligations is the duty to assess environmental impacts and to make environmental 
information public. This obligation is found in sources such as the Rio Declaration. 
Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration states that: “Environmental impact assessment, as 
a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to 
have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of 
a competent authority.”190 Principle 10 of the Declaration requires that individuals 
have access to information concerning the environment and that states facilitate 
public awareness by making information widely available.191 
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This procedural obligation is reflected in Framework Principles 7 and 8. 
Principle 7 holds that: “States should provide public access to environmental 
information by collecting and disseminating information and by providing affordable, 
effective and timely access to information to any person upon request.”192 This 
Principle notes that access to environmental information has two dimensions. First, 
states have an obligation to collect, update, and disseminate information about 
environmental matters, such as air and water quality, and the presence of hazardous 
substances.193 Second, states should provide “affordable, effective, and timely access” 
to environmental information held by public authorities upon request without the 
need to show a legal or other interest in the information.194 
Framework Principle 8 holds that: “To avoid undertaking or authorizing actions 
with environmental impacts that interfere with the full enjoyment of human rights, 
States should require the prior assessment of the possible environmental impacts of 
proposed projects and policies, including their potential effects on the enjoyment of 
human rights.”195 Environmental assessments should: occur early on in the decision-
making process; provide meaningful opportunities for public participation; consider 
alternatives to the proposed activity; and address all potential environmental impacts, 
including transboundary effects.196 Written reports should be issued that clearly 
describe the impacts, and decisions should be subject to review by an independent 
body.197 
Framework Principle 8 also notes that businesses have obligations to conduct 
human rights impact assessments.198 It holds that such assessments should be 
conducted in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human 
Rights.199 The Guiding Principles provide that businesses should: identify any actual 
or potential adverse human rights impacts that may result from the business’ activities; 
undertake meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups; and integrate the 
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findings from the assessment across relevant internal functions and processes and 
take appropriate action.200 
Duty to Facilitate Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making 
A second procedural obligation is the duty of states to facilitate public 
participation in environmental decision-making. This obligation is set out in several 
international instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the 
right of individuals to take part in the government of their country.201 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the right of individuals 
to take part in the conduct of public affairs.202 Human rights bodies have built upon 
these basic rights to public participation by outlining a duty to facilitate public 
participation in environmental decision-making.203  
The duty to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making is 
set out in Framework Principle 9, which holds that: “States should provide for and 
facilitate public participation in decision-making related to the environment, and take 
the views of the public into account in the decision-making process.”204 Such 
decision-making includes the development of laws, policies, regulations, projects, and 
activities.205 This duty requires states to provide all members of the public with 
adequate opportunity to express their views.206 States may be required to take 
additional steps to facilitate the participation of members of marginalized 
communities.207 
Duty to Provide Access to Legal Remedies 
The third procedural obligation set out in international human rights obligations 
is the duty of states to provide access to legal remedies. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and subsequent human rights agreements have established the 
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principle that states should provide for remedies for violations of protected rights.208 
Many international instruments have applied this principle to human rights that have 
been infringed by environmental harm.209  
The duty to provide access to legal remedies is set out in Framework Principle 
10, which holds that: “States should provide for access to effective legal remedies for 
violations of human rights and domestic laws relating to the environment.”210 To 
accomplish this, states should ensure that individuals have access to judicial and 
administrative procedures that: (1) are impartial, independent, affordable, transparent, 
and fair; (2) review claims in a timely manner; (3) have the requisite expertise and 
adequate resources; (4) provide for a right of appeal to a reviewing body; and (5) issue 
binding decisions for interim measures, compensation, restitution, and reparation.211 
States should provide the public with information about how to access remedies and 
should help the public overcome barriers to access such as expense and distance.212 
The three duties outlined above describe the main procedural obligations 
existing among best practices at international human rights law. Some of these 
procedural duties already exist in Canadian law. For example, the CEAA, 2012 
requires environmental assessments for certain designated projects.213 However, 
environmental assessment under the CEAA, 2012 has been criticized as being little 
more than a “post-planning regulatory hoop”214 that does not adequately address the 
interests of all parties affected by a project, including Indigenous peoples. Indigenous 
peoples across Canada have expressed a lack of trust in the environmental assessment 
process.215 Environmental assessment is viewed as being based on flawed planning, a 
misunderstanding of Indigenous knowledge and Aboriginal and treaty rights, and 
opaque decision-making.216 A robust conception of section 7 of the Charter informed 
by procedural duties set out in the Framework Principles could help fill some gaps in 
existing Canadian law.  
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Substantive Obligations 
The Special Rapporteur’s review of the existing body of international human 
rights law revealed that states have obligations to protect against environmental harm 
that interferes with the enjoyment of human rights.217 Although the content of 
specific environmental obligations are evolving, two primary duties have become 
clear: (1) the duty to implement legal frameworks to protect against environmental 
harm that may infringe human rights, and (2) the duty to regulate private actors to 
protect against environmental harm.218  
Duty to Implement Legal Frameworks to Protect Against Environmental Harm 
States have obligations to adopt legal and institutional frameworks to protect 
against environmental harm that can or does interfere with the enjoyment of human 
rights.219 These obligations arise from several human rights sources. For example, 
article 12(2)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights provides that states shall take steps to provide for the full realization of rights 
that include the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene.220 States therefore have an obligation to adopt measures to protect against 
environmental harm. 
The duty to implement legal frameworks to protect against environmental harm 
is reflected in Framework Principle 11, which holds that: “States should establish and 
maintain substantive environmental standards that are non-discretionary, non-
retrogressive and otherwise respect, protect and fulfil human rights.”221 These 
substantive environmental standards should regulate things such as “air quality, the 
global climate, freshwater quality, marine pollution, waste, toxic substances, protected 
areas, conservation and biological diversity.”222  
Principle 11 sets out a list of factors to consider in determining whether a state’s 
environmental standards respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. First, standards 
should be developed via procedures that comply with human rights obligations, 
including those relating to freedom of expression, information, participation, and 
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remedy.223 Second, standards should be consistent with all relevant international 
environmental, health, and safety standards, such as those set out by the World Health 
Organization.224 Third, while standards should take into account the best available 
science, a lack of full scientific certainty does not justify postponing effective and 
proportionate measures to prevent environmental harm.225 Fourth, standards must 
comply with all relevant human rights obligations.226 Finally, standards should not 
strike an unreasonable balance between environmental protection and other social 
goals given the effect of environmental protection on the full enjoyment of human 
rights.227 These factors provide a benchmark against which states’ environmental 
standards can be assessed to determine whether they comply with the obligation to 
implement a legal framework that respects, protects, and fulfils human rights. 
Duty to Regulate Private Actors to Protect Against Environmental Harm 
The second substantive obligation of states is to regulate private actors to protect 
against environmental harm that may infringe human rights. This obligation is found 
in sources such as the Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights, which 
requires states to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business enterprises, by “taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication.”228 The Guiding Principles also states that corporations themselves have 
responsibilities to protect human rights.229  
The duty to regulate private actors is set out in Framework Principle 12, which 
holds that: “States should ensure the effective enforcement of their environmental 
standards against public and private actors.”230 States should monitor and enforce 
compliance with standards by investigating and punishing violations of standards by 
private and public actors.231 Principle 12 also notes that, in accordance with the 
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responsibility to respect human rights.232 This includes a duty to avoid causing adverse 
human rights impacts through environmental harm, to address such impacts when 
they occur, and to mitigate adverse impacts that are directly related to their 
operations.233  
The duty to implement legal frameworks and to regulate private actors to protect 
against public harm are two of the main substantive obligations identified by the 
Special Rapporteur as existing among current international human rights law. As with 
procedural duties, these substantive duties exist to some extent in Canadian law. 
However, we need not look any further than to the serious health consequences 
experienced by members of Aamjiwnaang First Nation living near Chemical Valley 
for evidence of how existing substantive duties are inadequate to protect the health 
and well-being of many Canadians. A Canadian court grappling with the question of 
what a robust conception of the right to a healthy environment under section 7 could 
entail could look to the Framework Principles for answers as to the substantive 
content of the right. 
 
Obligations Towards Vulnerable Groups 
The third component of international best practices on human rights in the 
environmental context identified by the Special Rapporteur is obligations towards 
vulnerable groups. The Human Rights Council has recognized that environmental 
harm is felt most acutely by vulnerable segments of the population.234 Children, for 
example, are less resistant to many types of environmental harm.235 Of the 5.9 million 
deaths of children under the age of 5 in 2015, the World Health Organization 
estimates that more than 1.5 million deaths could have been prevented through the 
reduction of environmental risks.236 In addition to health risks, environmental threats 
like climate change exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities that prohibit 
the well-being of children.237 One example of this is that climate change-induced food 
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insecurity has increased the number of marriages of female children, who are 
pressured to marry to reduce burdens on their families.238 Other groups such as 
women, persons living in poverty, Indigenous peoples and members of traditional 
communities, the elderly, persons with disabilities, displaced persons, and ethnic, 
racial, or other minorities are also often at greater risk from environmental harm.239 
Many human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, provide for the right to equal protection under the law, including equal 
protection under environmental law.240 As such, states have additional obligations 
with respect to groups that are particularly vulnerable to environmental harm.241 
These obligations are set out in Framework Principles 3, 14, and 15. 
Framework Principle 3 requires the non-discriminatory application of states’ 
obligations. It holds that: “States should prohibit discrimination and ensure equal and 
effective protection against discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment.”242 States must provide for equal access to 
environmental benefits and ensure that their actions are not discriminatory.243 
Framework Principle 14 holds that: “States should take additional measures to 
protect the rights of those who are most vulnerable to, or at particular risk from, 
environmental harm, taking into account their needs, risks and capacities.”244 In 
developing laws and policies, states should consider the ways that some groups are 
more susceptible to environmental harm.245 They should also take into account the 
barriers that some groups face to exercising their human rights.246 Environmental 
assessments of proposed projects and policies should include an examination of the 
impacts on the most vulnerable segments of the population.247  
Framework Principle 15 recognizes that Indigenous peoples are often 
particularly vulnerable to environmental harm because of their close relationship with 
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the natural environment.248 Principle 15 requires states to ensure they comply with 
their obligations to Indigenous peoples and members of traditional communities, 
including by: (1) recognizing and protecting their rights to land; (2) consulting with 
Indigenous peoples and obtaining their free, prior, and informed consent; (3) 
respecting and protecting their traditional knowledge; and (4) ensuring they fairly and 
equitably share any benefits.249 
The Special Rapporteur’s review of international human rights obligations 
shows that, despite the lack of a universal declaration recognizing the right to a healthy 
environment, the existing body of human rights already imposes many duties on states 
relating to environmental protection. This “greening” of international human rights 
law has led to several identifiable procedural and substantive obligations, as well as 
additional obligations towards vulnerable groups. The Framework Principles codify 
these obligations, providing a strong outline to help states facilitate their practical 
implementation. As Canadian courts grapple with the question of whether section 7 
of the Charter protects a right to a healthy environment, the Framework Principles 
provide a useful guideline for what the content of a robust right might entail.  
Importing some of the duties outlined in the Framework Principles into the 
section 7 analysis could go a long way to addressing some of the challenges outlined 
in section 3 of this paper. For example, the substantive obligation to create legal 
frameworks to protect environmental health could address many of the gaps in 
Canada’s environmental regulatory regime. Obligations towards vulnerable groups 
and procedural obligations like providing access to remedies could help address access 
to justice issues. While importing the obligations in the Framework Principles into 
section 7 of the Charter would represent a significant expansion of the provision, the 
section 7 jurisprudence indicates, as the next section demonstrates, that the courts are 
moving incrementally towards a more robust understanding of section 7. 
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Canadian Jurisprudence Recognizes the Foundations of the Framework 
Principles 
Charter jurisprudence indicates that courts are moving towards a more robust 
and meaningful role for section 7 and a fuller capacity for the protections of life, 
liberty, and security of the person.250 Many of the fundamental principles underlying 
the Framework Principles have already been adopted into the section 7 analysis. 
Courts have articulated that section 7 contains both procedural and substantive 
obligations, and that it requires respect for vulnerable groups. As such, the basic 
foundations for the importation of the Framework Principles already exist within the 
section 7 jurisprudence. 
Procedural and Substantive Obligations 
Canadian courts have held that section 7 of the Charter comprises both 
procedural and substantive obligations. In Re BC Motor Vehicle Act,251 the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the phrase “principles of fundamental justice” in section 7 
contains procedural and substantive obligations.252 In that case, British Columbia’s 
Motor Vehicle Act created an absolute liability offence for driving while one’s driver’s 
licence was suspended. Because the Act imposed a penalty of imprisonment for 
violating the provincial regulatory provision, it was an inappropriate (and therefore 
unconstitutional) depravation of liberty.253 At issue was whether the principles of 
fundamental justice in section 7 include only procedural rights, or whether they also 
include substantive rights. Lamer J, writing for the majority, held that the principles 
of fundamental justice were breached by the imposition of imprisonment for an 
offence that lacked mens rea.254 Lamer J did not characterize this as a procedural issue; 
the absence of mens rea as an element of the offence was a substantive issue.255 Section 
7 was held to prohibit both substantive and procedural injustice.256 
Obligations Towards Vulnerable Groups 
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The jurisprudence has also recognized the need to consider equality issues and 
how the section 7 analysis affects vulnerable groups. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has noted that the section 7 analysis should be informed by equality concerns under 
section 15 of the Charter.257 Section 15(1) of the Charter states: “Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability.”258  
In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J),259 L’Heureux-
Dubé J in a concurring opinion highlighted the importance of equality interests in 
section 7 issues that disproportionately affect women living in poverty and members 
of racialized and other disadvantaged groups.260 L’Heureux-Dubé J stated that:  
in considering the s. 7 rights at issue, and the principles of 
fundamental justice that apply in this situation, it is important to 
ensure that the analysis takes into account the principles and 
purposes of the equality guarantee in promoting the equal 
benefit of the law and ensuring that the law responds to the 
needs of those disadvantaged individuals and groups whose 
protection is at the heart of s. 15. The rights in s. 7 must be 
interpreted through the lens of ss. 15 and 28, to recognize the 
importance of ensuring that our interpretation of the 
Constitution responds to the realities and needs of all members 
of society.261  
These statements demonstrate that the section 7 jurisprudence has already adopted 
the basic principle of non-discrimination that underlies the Framework Principles’ 
calls for the protection of vulnerable groups.  
The section 15 jurisprudence also supports an interpretation of section 7 that 
considers equality interests. In Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,262 the Supreme 
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Court held that section 15 is the broadest of all the Charter rights.263 Section 15 
“applies to and supports all other rights guaranteed by the Charter.”264 As such, section 
15 equality interests may be used in interpreting section 7 obligations more broadly 
to demand state response to the material and social needs of marginalized 
individuals.265  
The courts’ jurisprudence demonstrates that section 7 contains both procedural 
and substantive obligations, as well as obligations to consider equality interests of 
vulnerable groups. These are the basic principles underlying the Framework 
Principles. A court looking to articulate the content of a right to a healthy 
environment under section 7 thus has jurisprudential basis for importing some of the 
duties outlined in the Framework Principles. This is not to say, however, that courts 
can easily adopt the Framework Principles wholesale into section 7 of the Charter. As 
critics will note, there may be some doctrinal issues in adopting the Framework 
Principles. These are discussed in the following section. 
A Barrier to Implementation: The Positive Rights Debate 
One challenge to using the Framework Principles as a guideline for the content 
of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 is the ongoing debate over whether 
the Charter protects positive rights. Critics of an expansive reading of section 7 argue 
that the Charter only protects negative rights, i.e., the right to be free from state 
interference.266 They argue that positive rights (i.e., rights that require the state to take 
particular action) are not protected by the Charter. Many of the duties outlined by the 
Framework Principles contain positive obligations, such as requiring states to 
implement legal frameworks, provide information, and regulate private actors. As 
such, courts looking to the Framework Principles for guidance on the content of a 
right to a healthy environment under section 7 will likely have to address this issue. 
Questions about the existence of positive rights under section 7 should not 
prohibit the adoption of a robust right to a healthy environment or the use of the 
Framework Principles as guidance for the content of such a right. This is because the 
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distinction between positive and negative rights is not always clear-cut. As scholar 
Margot Young notes, “any tidy scheme whereby judicially protected rights are limited 
to negative obligations is logically and practically impossible.”267 Some negative rights 
contain certain positive aspects, such that they cannot clearly be classified as solely 
negative or positive rights.  
For example, the right to be tried within a reasonable time requires governments 
to spend money to establish efficient judicial institutions.268 In Schachter v Canada,269 
Lamer CJC, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, stated:  
Other rights will be more in the nature of “negative” rights, 
which merely restrict the government. However, even in those 
cases, the rights may have certain positive aspects. For instance, 
the right to life, liberty and security of the person is in one sense 
a negative right, but the requirement that the government 
respect the “fundamental principles of justice” may provide a 
basis for characterizing s. 7 as a positive right in some 
circumstances.270 
Given that positive and negative rights cannot always be distinguished, and that the 
Charter already protects some positive rights, critics’ arguments for the protection of 
negative rights only should not impose a barrier to the recognition of a robust right 
to a healthy environment under section 7 and the use of the Framework Principles as 
guidance for its content.   
Courts grappling with the question of the content of a right to a healthy 
environment can find useful guidance in the Framework Principles. The Framework 
Principles set out procedural and substantive obligations, as well as obligations 
towards vulnerable groups, that already exist in international human rights laws. The 
section 7 jurisprudence shows that courts have interpreted section 7 to include many 
of the fundamental principles underlying the Framework Principles. Thus, while 
implementing some of the duties outlined in the Framework Principles represents an 
expansion of section 7 rights, it is not a radical change in course given the courts’ 
existing jurisprudence. Looking to the Framework Principles to articulate a robust 
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conception of the right to a healthy environment could take Canada a long way in its 
journey to strengthen environmental protection.  
CONCLUSION 
The recognition of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the Charter 
would entail the recognition that government action that leads to environmental 
degradation can cause deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person just as 
surely as other forms of state action. Canadian courts have not yet recognized 
environmental rights under section 7, however, there are no doctrinal issues barring 
such a finding. The jurisprudence to date supports the conclusion that the courts are 
open to holding that such a right exists, and may do so in an appropriate case.  
The recognition of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 is important 
because it can strengthen Canada’s approach to environmental protection. Research 
from other countries with constitutionally protected environmental rights is 
compelling; advantages such as providing an alternative route to access remedies, 
preventing the rollback of environmental standards, and strengthening environmental 
laws are tangible benefits that can contribute to improved environmental 
performance. While a number of challenges may limit the usefulness of section 7 in 
certain instances, they are not so widespread as to render section 7 a useless tool in 
the environmental context. Further, implementing some of the Framework Principles, 
such as substantive obligations to implement legal frameworks and duties towards 
vulnerable groups could address challenges like gaps in legal protections and access 
to justice issues. A constitutional environmental right is thus an important tool for 
addressing environmental harms. 
Despite the usefulness of a right to a healthy environment under section 7 of 
the Charter, much remains to be done to clarify and implement the right to a healthy 
environment.271 Future work will need to clarify how environmental rights apply to 
particular issues, such as issues of gender and other types of discrimination, the 
responsibilities of businesses to protect the environment, and the obligations of states 
and corporations relating to transboundary environmental harm.272 At the local level, 
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more work is required to institutionalize support for capacity-building, such as 
initiatives to support education for environmental decision-makers and to strengthen 
accountability mechanisms for violations of environmental standards.273 Questions 
about the rights of future generations or intrinsic “rights of nature” will need to be 
addressed.274 A right to a healthy environment under section 7 of the Charter is thus 
just the beginning of the work to be done to address pressing environmental issues 
that can no longer be ignored.   
In his first report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Special 
Rapporteur John H. Knox stated: “Given the importance of clean air, safe water, 
healthy ecosystems and a stable climate to the ability of both current and future 
generations to lead healthy and fulfilling lives, global recognition of the right to a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment should be regarded as an urgent moral 
imperative.”275 Canada must do its part. Recognition of a right to a healthy 
environment under section 7 of the Charter is Canada’s first step in beginning to rectify 
its poor record of weak environmental protections.
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